The diplomatic path being followed by the Bush administration in regard to Iran's nuclear ambitions does not appear to be designed to lead to diplomatic compromise: rather, it appears designed to reach a diplomatic impasse.

The "nuclear posture" and "nuclear doctrine" [.pdf] recently adopted by the U.S. envisage nuclear strikes on non-nuclear countries that fit the Iran pattern.

Iran stands accused by the U.S. of possession of WMD (chemical and biological), of pursuing nuclear weapons, of possessing threatening missiles, of being the prime sponsor of terror [.pdf] among the world's nations, and of being an enemy of the United States.

A doctrine of preemption has been adopted by the administration against potential threats to the U.S., one already put into practice in the case of Iraq.

There are underground targets in Iran (nuclear facilities [1], [2], missile silos and production facilities, suspected chemical and biological facilities) against which the use of nuclear bombs would be more effective than conventional bombs.

Earth-penetrating nuclear bombs (B61-11) were incorporated into the U.S. stockpile in September 2001, according to the Congressional Research Service Report to Congress of October 2005 [.pdf]. Some of these are very low yield and will cause small collateral damage.

If a military confrontation with Iran starts, 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq will be at risk of Iranian missiles and of potentially overwhelming conventional Iranian forces. Early use of nuclear weapons may deter Iran from responding to an aerial attack.

The "legal" framework to support the nuking of Iran has been put in place: (a) the IAEA's Sept. 24 declaration of Iran's noncompliance with the NPT, which allows the U.S. to nuke Iran "legally," and (b) several UN resolutions adopted under Chapter VII that the U.S. can claim apply to Iran.

The people in the upper levels of the Bush administration (Cheney, Rumsfeld, Hadley, and the other "nuclear hitmen") can be expected, given their record, to be strongly in favor of the use of nuclear weapons against Iran.

There is no indication that anybody in the upper levels of the administration recognizes the potentially catastrophic consequences of using low-yield nuclear weapons against Iran.

Israel and its influential lobbies in the United States are applying pressure on the U.S. to act to stop Iran's nuclear program.

Various reports indicate that U.S. preparations for an air strike on Iran are ongoing (Philip Giraldi, William Arkin, Seymour Hersh, recent news). The U.S. recently issued a warning for U.S. citizens not to travel to Iran.

Iran's growing role as a regional power is incompatible with Cheney's strategic plan for a one-superpower world.

The Bush administration wishes to establish the value of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to "dissuade" and "deter" adversaries from pursuing paths contrary to U.S. interests.

The president as commander in chief has sole authority (without consulting Congress) to initiate hostilities against Iran and to order the use of nuclear weapons against Iran. The responsibility to save American lives is foremost among the duties of the chief executive.

Many important hard, deeply buried targets (HDBT) are beyond the reach of conventional explosive penetrating weapons and can be destroyed only with nuclear weapons.

Nuclear earth-penetrators need to penetrate only a few meters to achieve maximum effectiveness for destruction of underground facilities.

The yield required of a nuclear weapon to destroy an HDBT is 15 to 25 times smaller if the weapon is detonated a few meters below the surface than if it is detonated at the surface.

For attacks on HDBTs in remote, lightly populated areas, casualties can range from as few as hundreds at low yields to hundreds of thousands at high yields.

For urban targets, civilian casualties from a nuclear earth-penetrator weapon are less by a factor of 2 to 10 than those from a surface burst having 25 times the yield.

Iran has acquired and is seeking major, advanced missile components that can be combined to produce ballistic missiles with sufficient range to strike the United States.

Iran is developing weapons of mass destruction.

Iran has a nuclear energy and weapons program and aims to design, develop, and produce nuclear weapons.

If Iran were to accumulate enough fissile material from foreign sources, it might be able to develop a nuclear weapon in only one to three years.

Iran also has an active chemical weapons development and production program.

Iran is conducting research into biological weapons.

The IAEA vote. The U.S. pursued a declaration of Iran's noncompliance for several years. The U.S. finally succeeded in getting the very weak Sept. 24, 2005, resolution passed, which has no practical consequences other than allowing for the U.S. to use nuclear weapons against Iran "legally." The relentless pursuit of this declaration over several years, and making ElBaradei's reappointment conditional on it [1], [2], [3], was motivated by the exclusion clause in the 1995 negative security assurance, and indicates that the decision to nuke Iran was made several years ago.

Executive Order 13292 was issued March 2003, making the items "weapons of mass destruction" and "defense against transnational terrorism" classified. When the public finally learns that the administration had classified information about these items (shared with selected members of Congress, including Democrats), which justified the forward deployment of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf, it will be clear that the executive order was made so that this information could be kept classified and not subject to public scrutiny, thus also indicating that the decision to nuke Iran was made several years ago.

StratCom news release. The Strategic Command news release of Nov. 18, 2005, which stated that its "global strike" plan (already leaked earlier) had reached "operational capability," had one clear purpose: to remind China and Russia that they are in the U.S. crosshairs, and that any intervention by them in response to the U.S. strikes on Iran will be met with a "nuclear preemptive strike."

Hadley's appointment. Stephen Hadley, a nuclear weapons "enthusiast," was appointed deputy national security adviser in 2001. As a consequence, he could be moved smoothly and silently to the key position of national security adviser in the second Bush term with very little media attention (though it did get some). This indicates that the plan was in place as far back as 2001.

John Bolton and other "nuclear warriors." John Bolton's appointment as ambassador to the UN, against extraordinary bipartisan opposition, bypassing Congress, placing him in a position where he clearly does not belong, does not appear to make sense. It is understandable, however, if the reason for the appointment was that he would be the best person to defend the U.S. nuking of Iran at the UN. Several other "nuclear warriors" were placed in key positions at the beginning of the second Bush administration, positions that do not require special expertise in nuclear weapons. The use of nuclear weapons was apparently a given for the second Bush term.

Nuclear Posture Review. The "leaking" of carefully selected "excerpts" of the Nuclear Posture Review of 2002 was a deliberate effort to prepare the nation and the world for the nuking of Iran, several years before it was to take place.

NSPD 35. The classified presidential directive that, as we will learn soon enough, authorizes the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf, was signed in May 2004.

B61-11. The development and deployment of the B61-11 nuclear bunker-buster gathered momentum around 1995, at the same time that the U.S. began voicing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program and Clinton imposed an economic embargo on Iran.

Accusations against Iran. Accusations with no basis in reality have built up over many years. The "nuclear" aspect was always emphasized so that the public would accept the nuking of Iran. In particular, the baseless assertions in the 1998 Rumsfeld report that (1) "[Iran] has a nuclear energy and weapons program, which aims to design, develop, and as soon as possible produce nuclear weapons," (2) "Iran has acquired and is seeking major, advanced missile components that can be combined to produce ballistic missiles with sufficient range to strike the United States," and (3) "[Iran] might be able to develop a nuclear weapon in only one to three years" are meant to prepare Congress and the public for a nuclear strike on Iran.

Invasion of Iraq. The U.S. invasion of Iraq makes no sense in isolation; in fact, it has left Iran in a much stronger position in the region. Iran is the real regional power that can challenge U.S. interests in the long term, but in order to attack Iran in 2006, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a necessary prelude. Preparations for the Iraq invasion, and hence for the Iran attack, began at least as far back as 2001.

Isfahan is said to be the primary location of the Iranian nuclear weapons program.

Isfahan is also reportedly the site of Iran's largest missile assembly and production plant.

Isfahan is said to be one of Iran's major chemical weapons facilities.

Isfahan area is a major center for Iran's advanced defense industry.

The main operational facilities for the army's aviation units are located at Isfahan.

In addition to being a unique cultural, historical, and religious center, the city is famous for its rich, precious heritage, its charming artworks and handicrafts, as well as prominent scholars and scientists.

It is home to archaic mosques, including the 1,400-year-old Grand Mosque and Seyed Mosque, the largest and most famous mosque of the city dating back to two centuries ago.

Handicrafts such as enamels, handwoven carpets, and tilework.

The city will be named as the Second Cultural Capital of World of Islam at an official ceremony concurrent with Eid al-Qorban (Jan. 11).

At the ceremony, which is scheduled to be held at the historical majestic Imam Square, the flags of 57 Islamic states will be hoisted and Iran's national anthem will be played.

Contact your representatives by fax, telephone, letter, or in person.

Call radio talk shows.

Write letters and opinion pieces for local newspapers.

Bring the topic up with relatives, friends, newsgroups, and blogs, and encourage them to do the above.

Contact antiwar groups to organize events and rallies around this specific issue. A major demonstration should be planned for the moment Bush issues an ultimatum against Iran.

Think about one or two people who are above you in the opinion-shaping food chain whom you can perhaps convince that this is important. Eventually, the issue may reach celebrities who can give it wider publicity, then to government officials who could make a difference.

Purpose: to affirm the Congress' authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 14 of the U.S. Constitution to make rules for the government and regulation of the armed forces, and apply such authority to the United States' use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states.

Resolved: The United States armed forces shall not employ nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapons state in the absence of an explicit congressional authorization to that effect.

The president retains sole authority to authorize the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state in the presence of previously issued congressional authorization.

If a verifiable massive enemy attack with weapons of mass destruction against United States citizens or armed forces takes place that results in thousands of casualties, the president may authorize the emergency use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapons state in the absence of prior congressional authorization, in anticipation that Congress will grant authorization a posteriori.

Congress shall grant a posteriori authorization after it certifies that a massive enemy attack with WMD did occur prior to the U.S.' use of nuclear weapons.

If Congress does not certify that such an enemy attack took place, it shall decline to grant a posteriori authorization and the president shall be determined to be in violation of this law.