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IRAQ ON THE RECORD

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...................................................................................................................... i

I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................1

II. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................................................1

III. NUMBER AND TIMING OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS ................................................................3

IV. CATEGORIES OF MISLEADING STATEMENTS ..............................................................................6

A. Statements that Iraq Posed an Urgent Threat................................................................6

B. Statements about Iraq’s Nuclear Capabilities ...............................................................7

1. Claims about the Status of Iraq’s Nuclear Program ...........................................8

2. Claims about the Aluminum Tubes ....................................................................10

3. Claims about Uranium from Africa ...................................................................13

C. Statements about Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Programs ......................15

1. Claims about Chemical and Biological Weapons .............................................15

2. Claims about Unmanned Aerial Vehicles..........................................................18

3. Claims about Mobile Biological Laboratories ..................................................20

D. Statements about Iraq’s Support of al Qaeda..............................................................21

V. MISLEADING STATEMENTS BY INDIVIDUAL OFFICIALS............................................................25

A. President Bush..............................................................................................................25

B. Vice President Cheney..................................................................................................26

C. Secretary Rumsfeld.......................................................................................................27

D. Secretary Powell ..........................................................................................................28

E. National Security Advisor Rice ....................................................................................29

VI. CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................30

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM — MINORITY OFFICE

i

On March 19, 2003, U.S. forces began military operations in Iraq. Addressing the

nation about the purpose of the war on the day the bombing began, President

Bush stated: "The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not

live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of

mass murder."

One year later, many doubts have been raised regarding the Administration’s

assertions about the threat posed by Iraq. Prior to the war in Iraq, the President

and his advisors repeatedly claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass

destruction that jeopardized the security of the United States. The failure to

discover these weapons after the war has led to questions about whether the

President and his advisors were candid in describing Iraq’s threat.

This report, which was prepared at the request of Rep. Henry A. Waxman, is a

comprehensive examination of the statements made by the five Administration

officials most responsible for providing public information and shaping public

opinion on Iraq: President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney,

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. It finds that the five officials made

misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 125 public appearances.

The report and an accompanying database identify 237 specific misleading

statements by the five officials.

The Special Investigations Division compiled a database of statements about Iraq

made by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary

Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice. All of the statements in the database

were drawn from speeches, press conferences and briefings, interviews, written

statements, and testimony by the five officials.

This Iraq on the Record database contains statements made by the five officials

that were misleading at the time they were made. The database does not include

statements that appear in hindsight to be erroneous but were accurate reflections

of the views of intelligence officials at the time they were made. The entire

database is accessible to members of Congress and the public at

www.reform.house.gov/min.

This report is a summary of the Iraq on the Record database. Because the

officials’ statements have been compiled into a searchable database, the report can

make new observations about the topics that were the subject of misleading

claims, the timing of these claims, and the officials who were responsible. To

ensure objectivity, the report was peer reviewed for fairness and accuracy by two

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM — MINORITY OFFICE

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leading experts: Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and director of the Non-

Proliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and

Greg Thielmann, former acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation,

and Military Affairs in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and

Research.

Number of Misleading Statements. The Iraq on the Record database contains

237 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq that were made by

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell,

and National Security Advisor Rice. These statements were made in 125 separate

appearances, consisting of 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and briefings, 53

interviews, 4 written statements, and 2 congressional testimonies. Most of the

statements in the database were misleading because they expressed certainty

where none existed or failed to acknowledge the doubts of intelligence officials.

Ten of the statements were simply false.

Timing of the Statements. The statements began at least a year before the

commencement of hostilities in Iraq, when Vice President Cheney stated on

March 17, 2002: "We know they have biological and chemical weapons." The

Administration’s misleading statements continued through January 22, 2004,

when Vice President Cheney insisted: "there’s overwhelming evidence that there

was a connection between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government." Most of the

misleading statements about Iraq — 161 statements — were made prior to the

start of the war. But 76 misleading statements were made by the five

Administration officials after the start of the war to justify the decision to go to

war.

The 30-day period with the greatest number of misleading statements was the

period before the congressional vote on the Iraq war resolution. Congress voted

on the measure on October 10 and October 11, 2002. From September 8 through

October 8, 2002, the five officials made 64 misleading statements in 16 public

appearances. A large number of misleading statements were also made during the

two months before the war began. Between January 19 and March 19, 2003, the

five officials made 48 misleading statements in 26 public appearances.

Topics of the Statements. The 237 misleading statements can be divided into

four categories. The five officials made 11 statements that claimed that Iraq

posed an urgent threat; 81 statements that exaggerated Iraq’s nuclear activities; 84

statements that overstated Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons capabilities;

and 61 statements that misrepresented Iraq’s ties to al Qaeda.

Statements by President Bush. Between September 12, 2002, and July 17,

2003, President Bush made 55 misleading statements about the threat posed by

Iraq in 27 separate public appearances. On October 7, 2002, three days before the

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM — MINORITY OFFICE

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congressional votes on the Iraqi war resolution, President Bush gave a speech in

Cincinnati, Ohio, with 11 misleading statements, the most by any of the five

officials in a single appearance.

Some of the misleading statements by President Bush include his statement in the

January 28, 2003, State of the Union address that "the British government has

learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium

from Africa"; his statement on October 2, 2002, that "the Iraqi regime is a threat

of unique urgency"; and his statement on May 1, 2003, that "the liberation of Iraq

. . . removed an ally of al Qaeda."

Statements by Vice President Cheney. Between March 17, 2002, and January

22, 2004, Vice President Cheney made 51 misleading statements about the threat

posed by Iraq in 25 separate public appearances.

Some of the misleading statements by Vice President Cheney include his

statement on September 8, 2002, that "we do know, with absolute certainty, that

he is using his procurement system to acquire the equipment he needs . . . to build

a nuclear weapon"; his statement on March 16, 2003, that "we believe he has, in

fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons"; and his statement on October 10, 2003, that

Saddam Hussein "had an established relationship with al Qaeda."

Statements by Secretary Rumsfeld. Between May 22, 2002, and November 2,

2003, Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading statements about the threat posed

by Iraq in 23 separate public appearances.

Some of the misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld include his statement

on November 14, 2002, that within "a week, or a month" Saddam Hussein could

give his weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda, which could use them to attack

the United States and kill "30,000, or 100,000 . . . human beings"; his statement

on January 29, 2003, that Saddam Hussein’s regime "recently was discovered

seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa"; and his statement on July

13, 2003, that there "was never any debate" about whether Iraq had a nuclear

program.

Statements by Secretary Powell. Between April 3, 2002, and October 3, 2003,

Secretary Powell made 50 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in

34 separate public appearances.

Secretary Powell sometimes used caveats and qualifying language in his public

statements. His statements that contained such cautions or limitations were not

included in the database. Nonetheless, many of Secretary Powell’s statements did

not include these qualifiers and were misleading in their expression of certainty,

such as his statement on May 22, 2003, that "there is no doubt in our minds now

that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that was to make

biological weapons."

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

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Statements by National Security Advisor Rice. Between September 8, 2002,

and September 28, 2003, National Security Advisor Rice made 29 misleading

statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 16 separate public appearances.

Although Ms. Rice had the fewest public appearances and the fewest misleading

statements, she had the highest number of statements — 8 — that were false.

These false statements included several categorical assertions that that no one in

the White House knew of the intelligence community’s doubts about the

President’s assertion that Iraq sought to import uranium from Africa.

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM — MINORITY OFFICE

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The President and his senior advisors have a special obligation to describe

accurately the national security threats facing the nation. This special obligation

derives in part from the nature of the subject. There is no decision that is more

grave than sending our armed forces to battle. The special obligation also derives

in part from the unique access that the President and his advisors have to

classified information. On matters of national security, only the President and his

advisors have full access to the relevant classified information. Members of

Congress and the public see only a partial picture based on the information the

President and his advisors decide to release.

Recently, serious questions have been raised regarding whether President Bush

and his Administration met this special obligation. Numerous news reports and

columns have questioned the accuracy of specific statements by President Bush

and other Administration officials. The White House maintains that any

misstatements were "only a small part of an ‘overwhelming’ case that Iraqi

President Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the United States."1 Other observers,

though, have detected a pattern of consistent misrepresentation.

The one-year anniversary of the beginning of military operations in Iraq marks an

occasion for comprehensively assessing whether the President and his senior

advisors met their obligation to accurately present intelligence to the American

public. For this reason, Rep. Waxman asked the Special Investigations Division

to assemble in a single database any misleading statements made by President

Bush, Vice President Cheney, and other senior Administration officials about the

threat posed by Iraq. This report summarizes key findings from this Iraq on the

Record database. The database itself is available to members of Congress and the

public at www.reform.house.gov/min.

The Iraq on the Record database contains statements from the five Administration

officials most responsible for providing public information and shaping public

opinion on the Iraq war: President George Bush; Vice President Richard Cheney;

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld; Secretary of State Colin Powell; and

National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.

The statements in the database are drawn from 125 public statements or

appearances in which the five officials discussed the threat posed by Iraq. The

______________________________________________________________

1 White House Admits CIA Warned It before Speech, Los Angeles Times (July 23, 2003) (quoting

Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley).

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

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sources of the statements are 40 speeches, 26 press conferences and briefings, 53

interviews, 4 written statements and articles, and 2 appearances before

congressional committees. Quotes from the officials in newspaper articles or

other similar secondary sources were not included in the database because of the

difficulty of discerning the context of such quotes and ensuring their accuracy.

Statements made by the officials before March 2002, one year before the

commencement of hostilities in Iraq, were also not included.

The database contains statements that were misleading based on what was known

to the Administration at the time the statements were made. In compiling the

database, the Special Investigations Division did not assess whether

"subjectively" the officials believed a specific statement to be misleading.

Instead, the investigators used an "objective" standard. For purposes of the

database, a statement is considered "misleading" if it conflicted with what

intelligence officials knew at the time or involved the selective use of intelligence

or the failure to include essential qualifiers or caveats.

The database does not include statements that appear mistaken only in hindsight.

If a statement was an accurate reflection of U.S. intelligence at the time it was

made, the statement is excluded from the database even if it now appears

erroneous.

To determine whether a statement was misleading, the Special Investigations

Division examined the statement in light of intelligence known to the

Administration at the time of the statement. The primary sources for determining

the intelligence available to the Administration were (1) the portions of the

October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate that have been released to the public,

(2) the February 5, 2004, statement by Director of Central Intelligence George

Tenet entitled Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction, (3) the recent report of the

nonpartisan Carnegie Endowment for International Peace entitled WMD in Iraq:

Evidence and Implications, and (4) news and other reports quoting U.S. officials

regarding the intelligence available to the Administration on Iraq.

In general, hypothetical and implied statements about threats posed by Iraq were

not included in the database of misleading statements. A few such statements

were included, however, where they implied a threat in evocative and frightening

language. These statements were misleading because the effect was to instill in

the public the perception that the threat actually existed.

To be conservative, the Special Investigations Division excluded hundreds of

statements by the five officials that many observers would consider misleading.

For example, the five officials made numerous claims that Iraq "had" stockpiles

of chemical weapons. Many of these statements were misleading in that they

implied that Iraq possessed these stockpiles currently and did not acknowledge

the doubts of intelligence experts. Nevertheless, these statements were not

included in the database when they were expressed in the past tense because Iraq

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

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did possess chemical weapons at least as late as the early 1990s and used them

during the 1980s.2

Investigators also excluded scores of statements of certainty that Iraq possessed

"weapons of mass destruction" prior to the war. To many observers, these

statements would be misleading because they implied that Iraq possessed nuclear

weapons without acknowledging the divisions among intelligence officials about

whether this was the case. The Special Investigations Division excluded these

general "weapons of mass destruction" assertions, however, because of the

ambiguity inherent in the phrase.

The Special Investigations Division asked two leading independent experts to

peer review this report for fairness and accuracy. These two independent experts

are: Joseph Cirincione, senior associate and director of the Non-Proliferation

Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Greg Thielmann,

former acting director of the Office of Strategic, Proliferation, and Military

Affairs in the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. These

experts judged that this report is a fair and accurate depiction of the

Administration’s statements.

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell,

and National Security Advisor Rice repeatedly made misleading statements about

the threat posed by Iraq. They made these statements in 125 separate public

appearances. The total number of misleading statements made by the five

officials is 237.

The 237 misleading statements were made in a variety of forums. On 53

occasions, the five officials gave interviews in which they made claims that were

misleading. They also made misleading statements in 40 speeches, 26 press

conferences and briefings, 4 written statements and articles, and 2 appearances

before Congress.

The misleading statements began at least one year before the start of the war in

Iraq, when Vice President Cheney stated on March 17, 2002:

The President’s made it clear that we are concerned about nations such as

Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction. We know the Iraqis have

been engaged in such efforts over the years. We know they have

______________________________________________________________

2 United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, Unresolved Disarmament

Issues: Iraq’s Proscribed Weapons Programmes, UNMOVIC Working Document (Mar. 6, 2003).

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

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biological and chemical weapons. . . . And we also have reason to believe

they’re pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons.3

These misleading statements have continued through at least January 2004. On

January 22, 2004, Vice President Cheney said in a National Public Radio

interview, "I think there’s overwhelming evidence that there was a connection

between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi government. . . . I’m very confident that there

was an established relationship there."4 He also said in the same interview, "we

know . . . that prior to our going in that he had spent time and effort acquiring

mobile biological weapons labs, and we’re quite confident he did, in fact, have

such a program. We’ve found a couple of semi trailers at this point which we

believe were, in fact, part of that program." As described below, both of these

assertions were misleading in that they failed to disclose the serious doubts held

by intelligence officials.

The majority of the misleading statements — 161 — were made in the buildup to

the war in Iraq. The volume of misleading statements by the five officials peaked

before key decision points in the buildup to the war. Congress began debate on

the Iraq war resolution in early October 2002 and voted on the measure on

October 10 and October 11, 2002. During the 30 days between September 8 and

October 8, 2002, the five officials made 64 misleading statements in 16 public

appearances. This was the highest number of misleading statements for any 30-

day period.

There were also a large number of misleading statements in the two months

before hostilities began on March 19, 2003, when the five officials made 48

misleading statements in 26 public appearances.

Figure 1 shows the ebb and flow of misleading statements over time.

______________________________________________________________

3 White House, Press Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney and his Highness Salmam bin

Hamad Al Khalifa, Crown Prince of Bahrain, at Shaikh Hamat Palace (Mar. 17, 2002).

4 Morning Edition, National Public Radio (Jan. 22, 2004).

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

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0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Mar

Apr

May

June

July

Aug

Sept

Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

Feb

Mar

Apr

May

June

July

Aug

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Oct

Nov

Dec

Jan

2002 2003 2004

Most of the misleading statements in the Iraq on the Record database involve the

selective use of intelligence or the failure to include essential qualifiers or caveats.

For example, statements of certainty that Iraq was close to possessing nuclear

weapons were misleading because they ignored significant doubts and

disagreement in the U.S. intelligence community regarding whether Iraq was

actively pursuing a nuclear program.

In 10 instances, however, the statements included in the database were false

statements that directly contradicted facts known at the time by the

Administration. For example, on July 11, 2003, Ms. Rice stated with respect to

the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium in Africa: "Now, if there were doubts

about the underlying intelligence . . . those doubts were not communicated to the

President, to the Vice President, or to me."5 This statement is false because, as

Ms. Rice’s deputy Stephen Hadley subsequently acknowledged, the CIA sent Ms.

Rice and Mr. Hadley memos in October 2002 warning against the use of this

claim.6

______________________________________________________________

5 White House, Press Gaggle with Ari Fleischer and Dr. Condoleezza Rice (July 11, 2003).

6 White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing on Iraq Weapons of Mass

Destruction and the State of the Union Speech (July 22, 2003).

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The misleading statements by President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary

Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice fall into four

general categories: (1) statements suggesting that Iraq posed an urgent threat, (2)

statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear activities, (3) statements regarding Iraq’s

biological and chemical weapons capabilities, and (4) statements regarding Iraq’s

support of al Qaeda. Figure 2 shows the number of misleading statements in each

category.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

Urgent Threat Nuclear Activities Biological/Chemical

Weapons

Al-Qaeda

On February 5, 2004, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet categorically

stated that the U.S. intelligence community "never said there was an ‘imminent’

threat."7 Yet this was not the impression conveyed by President Bush, Vice

President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security

Advisor Rice in their public statements on Iraq. In 10 different appearances, these

five officials made 11 statements claiming that Iraq posed an urgent threat.

For example:

______________________________________________________________

7 Central Intelligence Agency, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Director of Central

Intelligence George J. Tenet at Georgetown University (Feb. 5, 2004).

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• President Bush stated on October 2, 2002: "the Iraqi regime is a threat of

unique urgency. . . . [I]t has developed weapons of mass death."8

• President Bush stated on November 20, 2002: "Today the world is . . .

uniting to answer the unique and urgent threat posed by Iraq."9

• Vice President Cheney stated on August 26, 2002: "Simply stated, there is

no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction.

There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against

our allies, and against us."10

In one instance, Secretary Rumsfeld said that Iraq could give weapons of mass

destruction to al Qaeda in "a week, or a month," resulting in the deaths of up to

100,000 people. On November 14, 2002, Secretary Rumsfeld stated:

Now, transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a month,

and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass destruction and

transfer them, either use them himself, or transfer them to the Al-Qaeda,

and somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack on the United

States, or an attack on U.S. forces overseas, with a weapon of mass

destruction you’re not talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being

killed, but 30,000, or 100,000 . . . human beings."11

In their potential for destruction and their ability to evoke horror, nuclear weapons

are in a class by themselves. As Dr. David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq

Survey Group, testified on January 28, 2004: "all of us have and would continue

to put the nuclear weapons in a different category. It’s a single weapon that can

do tremendous damage, as opposed to multiple weapons that can do the same

order of damage. . . . I think we should politically treat nuclear as a difference."12

______________________________________________________________

8 White House, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution (Oct. 2, 2002).

9 President Bush Speaks to Atlantic Youth Council, CNN (Nov. 20, 2002).

10 White House, Vice President Speaks at VFW 103rd National Convention (Aug. 26, 2002).

11 U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld Live Interview with Infinity CBS Radio (Nov.

14, 2002).

12 Testimony of David Kay, former special advisor to the Iraq Survey Group, before the Senate

Armed Services Committee, Hearing on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction and Related

Programs (Jan. 28, 2004).

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For precisely this reason, the Administration’s statements about Iraq’s nuclear

capabilities had a large impact on congressional and public perceptions about the

threat posed by Iraq. Many members of Congress were more influenced by the

Administration’s nuclear assertions than by any other piece of evidence. Rep.

Waxman, for example, wrote to President Bush in June 2003 that in voting for the

Iraq war resolution: "Like other members, I was particularly influenced by your

views about Iraq’s nuclear intentions. Although chemical and biological weapons

can inflict casualties, no threat is greater than the threat of nuclear weapons."13

Numerous members of Congress stressed Iraq’s nuclear threat in their floor

statements explaining their support of the resolution.14

Despite the significance of the nuclear issue, President Bush, Vice President

Cheney, Secretary Powell, Secretary Rumsfeld, and National Security Advisor

Rice repeatedly misrepresented the nuclear threat posed by Iraq. The five

officials made 49 separate public appearances in which they made misleading

statements about Iraq’s nuclear threat. In these appearances, they made a total of

81 misleading statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear activities.

These misleading statements generally fall into one of three categories: (1)

misleading statements about the status of Iraq’s nuclear program, (2) misleading

statements about the purpose of aluminum tubes sought by Iraq, and (3)

misleading statements about Iraq’s attempts to obtain uranium from Africa.

Prior to the war, there were significant divisions within the intelligence

community about whether Iraq had resumed efforts to make nuclear weapons. In

his speech on February 5, 2004, Mr. Tenet explained that there was not unanimity

on whether Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear program and that these differences

were described in the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): "let me be clear,

where there were differences, the Estimate laid out the disputes clearly."15 In

particular, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)

concluded in the NIE that "[t]he activities we have detected do not, however, add

up to a compelling case that Iraq is currently pursuing what INR would consider

to be an integrated and comprehensive approach to acquire nuclear weapons."

INR added: "Lacking persuasive evidence that Baghdad has launched a coherent

effort to reconstitute its nuclear weapons program, INR is unwilling to speculate

______________________________________________________________

13 Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman to President George W. Bush (June 2, 2003).

14 See, e.g., Statement of Senator Mary Landrieu, Congressional Record, S10330 (Oct. 10, 2002);

Statement of Rep. C.L. "Butch" Otter, Congressional Record, H7787 (Oct. 10, 2002); Statement

of Rep. Dennis Moore, Congressional Record, H7796 (Oct. 10, 2002).

15 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 7.

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

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that such an effort began soon after the departure of UN inspectors."16 The INR

position was similar to the conclusions of the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA), which concluded that there was "no indication of resumed

nuclear activities . . . nor any indication of nuclear-related prohibited activities."17

These doubts and qualifications, however, were not communicated to the public.

Instead, the five Administration officials repeatedly made unequivocal comments

about Iraq’s nuclear program. For example, President Bush said in October 2002

that "[t]he regime has the scientists and facilities to build nuclear weapons and is

seeking the materials required to do so."18 Several days later, President Bush

asserted that Saddam Hussein "is moving ever closer to developing a nuclear

weapon."19

Vice President Cheney made perhaps the single most egregious statement about

Iraq’s nuclear capabilities, claiming: "we know he has been absolutely devoted to

trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted

nuclear weapons."20 He made this statement just three days before the war. He

did not admit until September 14, 2003, that his statement was wrong and that he

"did misspeak."21

President Bush and others portrayed the threat of Saddam Hussein waging nuclear

war against the United States or its allies as one of the most urgent reasons for

preemptively attacking Iraq. Administration officials used evocative language

and images. On the eve of congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, for

example, President Bush stated: "Knowing these realities, America must not

ignore the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot

wait for the final proof — the smoking gun — that could come in the form of a

mushroom cloud."22

______________________________________________________________

16 National Intelligence Council, Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Key Judgements (from October 2002 NIE) (declassified July 18, 2003).

17 In a Chief Inspector’s Words: ‘A Substantial Measure of Disarmament,’ New York Times

(Mar. 8, 2003).

18 White House, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution, supra note 8.

19 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat; Remarks by the President on Iraq (Oct. 7,

2002).

20 Meet the Press, NBC (Mar. 16, 2003).

21 Meet the Press, NBC (Sept. 14, 2003). On May 20, 2003, the Washington Post reported that

Vice President Cheney’s aides said, "Cheney was referring to Saddam Hussein’s nuclear

programs, not weapons." White House Notebook: Energy Policy Spurs Affirmative Action

Debate, Washington Post (May 20, 2003).

22 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, supra note 19.

IRAQ ON THE RECORD: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON IRAQ

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Following the commencement of military operations in Iraq, Administration

officials continued to make misleading statements regarding Iraq’s nuclear

program. For example, Secretary Rumsfeld denied on July 13, 2003, that there

was "any debate" about Iraq’s nuclear capabilities within the Administration,

stating: "We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate."23

Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has been unable to find evidence of

the nuclear program described by the five officials. On October 2, 2003, David

Kay reported that "we have not uncovered evidence that Iraq undertook

significant post-1998 steps to actually build nuclear weapons or produce fissile

material."24 In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay reported that "[i]t was

not a reconstituted, full-blown nuclear program."25 He added, "As best as has

been determined . . . in 2000 they had decided that their nuclear establishment had

deteriorated to such point that it was totally useless."26 His conclusion was that

there was "no doubt at all" that Iraq had less of an ability to produce fissile

material in 2001 than in 1991.27 According to Dr. Kay, the nuclear program had

been "seriously degraded" and the "activities of the inspectors in the early ‘90s

did a tremendous amount."28

In 2001 and 2002, shipments of aluminum tubes to Iraq were intercepted.29 This

discovery led to an active debate within intelligence agencies about the intended

use of the tubes.

Numerous experts believed the tubes were for conventional rockets rather than a

nuclear development program. In his February 5, 2004, speech, Mr. Tenet

explained that disagreement over the purpose of the aluminum tubes was "a

______________________________________________________________

23 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (July 13, 2003).

24 Statement by David Kay on the Interim Progress Report on the Activities of the Iraq Survey

Group (ISG) before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the House Committee

on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

(Oct. 2, 2003).

25 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12.

26 Id.

27 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (Oct. 5, 2003).

28 Id.

29 Speculation, Fact Hard to Separate in Story of Iraq’s ‘Nuclear’ Tubes, USA Today (Aug. 1,

2003).

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debate laid out extensively in the estimate and one that experts still argue over."30

The agency with the most technical expertise in this area, the Department of

Energy, believed that the tubes likely were not part of a nuclear enrichment

program, stating in the NIE that "the tubes probably are not part of the

program."31 The International Atomic Energy Agency agreed, concluding:

"There is no indication that Iraq has attempted to import aluminum tubes for use

in centrifuge enrichment."32

In addition to dissent from the Energy Department and international inspectors,

the State Department also expressed formal reservations, stating in the NIE that

"INR is not persuaded that the tubes in question are intended for use as centrifuge

rotors."33 Instead, the State Department accepted the "judgment of technical

experts at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) who have concluded that the

tubes Iraq seeks to acquire are poorly suited for use in gas centrifuges." The State

Department explained its position in detail:

The very large quantities being sought, the way the tubes were tested by

the Iraqis, and the atypical lack of attention to operational security in the

procurement efforts are among the factors, in addition to the DOE

assessment, that lead INR to conclude that the tubes are not intended for

use in Iraq’s nuclear weapon program.35

According to the NIE, "INR considers it far more likely that the tubes are

intended for another purpose, most likely the production of artillery rockets."36

These doubts about the use of the aluminum tubes were not conveyed by

Administration officials, however. Instead, the aluminum tubes became one of

the two principal pieces of information cited by the Administration to support the

claim that Iraq was reconstituting its nuclear weapons program. President Bush,

Vice President Cheney, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice

made 10 misleading statements in 9 public appearances about the significance of

the aluminum tubes.

______________________________________________________________

30 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 7.

31 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.

32 U.N. Split Widens as Allies Dismiss Deadline on Iraq, New York Times (Mar. 7, 2003).

33 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id.

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For example, Ms. Rice stated on September 8, 2002: "We do know that there

have been shipments going into . . . Iraq . . . of aluminum tubes that . . . are only

really suited for nuclear weapons programs, centrifuge programs."37 Similarly,

Vice President Cheney said on September 8, 2002: "[Saddam Hussein] now is

trying, through his illicit procurement network, to acquire the equipment he needs

to be able to enrich uranium to make the bombs . . . [s]pecifically aluminum

tubes."38 These statements were misleading because they did not present the

possibility that the tubes were suitable or intended for another purpose, or

acknowledge that key U.S. experts doubted that the tubes were intended to make

nuclear bombs.

In one instance, Secretary Powell did acknowledge that some experts disputed

that the aluminum tubes were intended for nuclear uses. In his February 5, 2003,

address before the United Nations, Secretary Powell stated, "By now, just about

everyone has heard of these tubes and we all know that there are differences of

opinion. There is controversy about what these tubes are for. Most US experts

think they are intended to serve as rotors in centrifuges used to enrich uranium."39

Even in that statement, however, Secretary Powell did not make clear that experts

from the Department of Energy and the State Department’s own intelligence

division played a significant role in the analysis of this issue and in formal and

deliberate dissents had disputed the view that the tubes would likely be used to

enrich uranium.

On another occasion, Secretary Powell cited the tubes as evidence of pursuit of

nuclear weapons, without noting that the intended use of the tubes was under

dispute, asserting: "We also know that Iraq has tried to obtain high-strength

aluminum tubes, which can be used to enrich uranium in centrifuges for a nuclear

weapons program."40

By January 27, 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency had reached the

tentative conclusion that the aluminum tubes "would be consistent with the

purpose stated by Iraq and, unless modified, would not be suitable for

manufacturing centrifuges."41 Following the occupation of Iraq, the Iraq Survey

______________________________________________________________

37 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, CNN (Sept. 8, 2002).

38 Meet the Press, NBC (Sept. 8, 2002).

39 U.S. Department of State, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, Secretary Colin L.

Powell (Feb. 5, 2003).

40 U.S. Department of State, Press Conference with Secretary of State Colin Powell re: U.S.

Reaction to Iraqi Arms Declaration (Dec. 19, 2002).

41 UN News Centre, IAEA Chief: No Evidence So Far of Revived Iraqi Nuclear Arms Programme

(Jan. 27, 2003).

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Group did not find evidence indicating that the tubes were intended for nuclear

use. In his January 28, 2004, testimony, Dr. Kay announced: "It is my judgment,

based on the evidence that was collected . . . that it’s more probable that those

tubes were intended for use in a conventional missile program, rather than in a

centrifuge program."42

Another significant component of the Administration’s nuclear claims was the

assertion that Iraq had sought to import uranium from Africa. As one of few new

pieces of intelligence, this claim was repeated multiple times by Administration

officials as proof that Iraq had reconstituted its nuclear weapons program. In

total, the five Administration officials made misleading assertions about Iraq’s

attempts to obtain uranium from Africa in 7 statements in 6 public appearances.

In his State of the Union address on January 28, 2003, President Bush stated:

"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought

significant quantities of uranium from Africa. . . . Saddam Hussein has not

credibly explained these activities. He clearly has much to hide."43

Other officials echoed this statement. In a January 23, 2003, New York Times oped

piece, Ms. Rice argued that Iraq had lied in its December 2002 declaration,

noting: "the declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get

uranium from abroad."44 In his opening remarks in his televised press conference

on January 29, 2003, Secretary Rumsfeld stated, "[Saddam Hussein’s] regime . . .

recently was discovered seeking significant quantities of uranium from Africa."45

These claims that Iraq was seeking to import uranium were misleading. The

documentary evidence behind the assertions was declared to be "not authentic" by

the International Atomic Energy Agency.46 An envoy, former Ambassador

Joseph Wilson, was sent by the CIA to investigate the alleged purchase.47

Ambassador Wilson concluded that it was "highly doubtful that any such

______________________________________________________________

42 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12.

43 White House, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003).

44 Condoleezza Rice, Why We Know Iraq Is Lying, New York Times (Jan. 23, 2003).

45 Press Conference with Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, CNN (Jan. 29, 2003).

46 Some Evidence on Iraq Called Fake; U.N. Nuclear Inspector Says Documents on Purchases

Were Forged, Washington Post (Mar. 8, 2003).

47 Joseph Wilson, What I Didn’t Find in Africa, New York Times (July 6, 2003).

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transaction had ever taken place," and on his return, he provided detailed briefings

to the CIA and to the State Department African Affairs Bureau.48

When evidence emerged that the importation claim was false, Ms. Rice claimed

that the White House had no knowledge of these doubts. She asserted

unequivocally that no senior White House officials were informed about questions

about the uranium claim prior to its use in the State of the Union address. She

stated that "[t]he intelligence community did not know at that time, or at levels

that got to us . . . that there was serious questions about this report."49 As she put

it on another occasion:

[H]ad there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence in

or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the Director of

Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone.50

Ms. Rice’s claims were simply false. The CIA sent two memos to the National

Security Council — one of which was addressed to Ms. Rice personally —

warning against including the claim in a speech by the President.51 Director of

Central Intelligence George Tenet also "argued personally" to Ms. Rice’s deputy

national security adviser, Stephen Hadley, "that the allegation should not be used"

by the President.52 Further, in the October 2002 NIE provided to top White

House officials, the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research had

stated that claims that Iraq sought to acquire uranium in Africa were "highly

dubious."53

Ultimately, the White House was forced to admit its error. On July 9, 2003,

White House spokesperson Ari Fleischer said that the statement about importing

uranium from Africa "should not have risen to the level of a presidential

speech."54 The White House minimized the significance of the Administration’s

use of the Niger claim, arguing that it was "only a small part of an

______________________________________________________________

48 Id.

49 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (June 8, 2003).

50 Face the Nation, CBS (July 13, 2003).

51 White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing, supra note 6.

52 CIA Got Uranium Reference Cut in Oct.; Why Bush Cited It in Jan. Is Unclear, Washington

Post (July 13, 2003); see also White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing,

supra note 6.

53 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.

54 White House, Ari Fleischer Holds News Briefing (July 9, 2003).

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‘overwhelming’ case that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein posed a threat to the

United States."55

President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell,

and National Security Advisor Rice made misleading statements regarding Iraq’s

chemical and biological weapons programs in 61 public appearances. In these

appearances, the five officials made 84 different misleading statements. These

statements addressed three general topics: (1) Iraq’s chemical and biological

weapons, (2) Iraq’s efforts to build unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and (3)

Iraq’s mobile biological laboratories.

Prior to the war, there were questions within the intelligence community about

whether Iraq in fact possessed stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

Because Iraq previously had such stockpiles, had used them in the past, and had

not adequately demonstrated that all previously produced stockpiles had been

destroyed, the intelligence community made an assessment in the October NIE

that it was likely that Iraq continued to possess them. Because intelligence

agencies had no direct evidence of such stockpiles, however, the conclusions in

the October NIE were cast in the context of an intelligence "estimate." The NIE

began its sections on chemical and biological weapons with the phrases "we

assess" and "we judge." The NIE concluded that Iraq "probably" had stockpiled

chemicals and "probably" had genetically engineered biological agents. The NIE

also included major qualifiers, such as: "We lack specific information on many

key aspects of Iraq’s WMD programs."56

Other intelligence assessments specifically cited the uncertainty surrounding

Iraq’s possession of such stockpiles. In September 2002, the Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA) issued a report that concluded: "There is no reliable information

on whether Iraq is producing and stockpiling chemical weapons or where Iraq has

— or will — establish its chemical warfare agent production facilities."57 The

report also observed that "[a] substantial amount of Iraq’s chemical warfare

agents, precursors, munitions, and production equipment were destroyed between

______________________________________________________________

55 White House Admits CIA Warned It before Speech, supra note 1.

56 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.

57 Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraq — Key WMD Facilities — An Operational Support Study

(Sept. 2002) (unclassified excerpts are available at http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates

/article.asp?newsID=4928).

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1991 and 1998 as a result of Operation Desert Storm and UNSCOM (United

Nations Special Commission) actions."58 While the report assessed that Iraq

"probably" retained some "CW agents," it warned that "we lack any direct

information."59

Despite these uncertainties among the intelligence officials, the five

Administration officials made 45 misleading statements in 35 appearances about

Iraq’s possession of chemical or biological weapons. Often these statements were

misleading because they projected certainty about their claims. Secretary Powell,

for example, claimed, "there is no doubt in our mind that he still has chemical

weapons stocks."60 Secretary Rumsfeld stated: "He has at this moment

stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons."61 Vice President Cheney

asserted: "We know they have biological and chemical weapons."62 And

President Bush said bluntly, "he’s got them."63

Administration officials sometimes claimed to have specific details about

stockpile locations and movements. In his speech to the United Nations, for

example, Secretary Powell showed photographs of supposed Iraqi chemical

stockpiles, stating: "How do I know that? How can I say that? Let me give you a

closer look. Look at the image on the left. On the left is a close-up of one of the

four chemical bunkers. The two arrows indicate the presence of sure signs that

the bunkers are storing chemical munitions."64

Secretary Rumsfeld was even more specific, claiming that the Iraqis were

"moving them to different locations as often as every 12 to 24 hours and placing

them in residential neighborhoods."65 He also made this statement: "We know

where they are. They’re in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west,

south, and north somewhat."66

______________________________________________________________

58 Id.

59 Id.

60 Fox News Sunday, Fox TV (Sept. 8, 2002).

61 Testimony by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, House Armed Services Committee

(Sept. 18, 2002).

62 White House, Press Conference by Vice President Dick Cheney, supra note 3.

63 White House, Remarks by the President at Missouri Welcome (Nov. 4, 2002).

64 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39.

65 Department of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld and Richard Myers Hold Regular Department of

Defense Briefing (Mar. 11, 2003).

66 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, ABC (Mar. 30, 2003).

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The five officials also drew selectively from individual intelligence sources. In

1995, Hussein Kamel, the Iraqi official who had been in charge of Iraq’s weapons

of mass destruction programs, defected and described how Iraq had violated U.N.

resolutions in the early 1990s.67 Administration officials cited these claims

repeatedly. For example, President Bush said:

In 1995, after several years of deceit by the Iraqi regime, the head of Iraq’s

military industries defected. It was then that the regime was forced to

admit that it had produced more than 30,000 liters of anthrax and other

deadly biological agents. . . . This is a massive stockpile of biological

weapons that has never been accounted for, and capable of killing

millions.68

President Bush failed to disclose, however, that this same defector reported to

U.N. inspectors that Iraq had destroyed all of its chemical and biological weapons

stocks.69

Since the war ended, the Iraq Survey Group has reported that it is unlikely that

chemical or biological stockpiles existed prior to the war. As Dr. Kay concluded:

"I’m personally convinced that there were not large stockpiles of newly produced

weapons of mass destruction. We don’t find the people, the documents or the

physical plants that you would expect to find if the production was going on."70

Dr. Kay reported in October 2003 that "Iraq’s large-scale capability to develop,

produce, and fill new CW munitions was reduced — if not entirely destroyed —

during Operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox, 13 years of UN sanctions and UN

inspections."71

Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet echoed these findings: "It also

appears that Iraq had the infrastructure and talent to resume production — but we

have yet to find that it actually did so, nor have we found weapons."72 His bottom

______________________________________________________________

67 How Saddam Happened, Newsweek (Sept. 23, 2002).

68 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, supra note 19.

69 The Defector’s Secrets, Newsweek (Mar. 3, 2003); see also What Went Wrong, Newsweek (Feb.

9, 2004).

70 Ex-Inspector Says CIA Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program, New York Times (Jan. 26,

2004).

71 Statement by David Kay, supra note 24.

72 Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 7.

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line was that "we do not know if production took place — and just as clearly —

we have not yet found biological weapons."73

Prior to the war, Administration officials raised the specter of Iraq using

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to distribute chemical or biological weapons

directly over the United States. Although there was agreement within the

intelligence community that Iraq had a UAV program, there was a sharp split over

whether these UAVs were designed to deliver chemical or biological weapons.

The October NIE concluded that the UAV program was "probably" intended to

deliver biological weapons. However, the government entity most knowledgeable

about UAVs and their potential applications, the Air Force’s National Air and

Space Intelligence Center, disagreed with this conclusion.74 According to the

NIE, the U.S. Air Force "does not agree that Iraq is developing UAVs primarily

intended to be delivery platforms for chemical and biological (CBW) agents."

Instead, the Air Force experts asserted that "[t]he small size of Iraq’s new UAV

strongly suggests a primary role of reconnaissance."75

The five Administration officials did not acknowledge these doubts in their public

statements, however. Instead, they made misleading assertions regarding the

purpose of the UAVs in 5 statements in 5 public appearances.

For example, on October 7, 2002, just days before the October 10 and October 11,

2002, congressional votes on the Iraqi war resolution, President Bush claimed that

"Iraq has a growing fleet of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles that could be

used to disperse chemical or biological weapons." He did not disclose that

experts at the Air Force found such a use improbable. Instead, he highlighted the

fear of Iraq’s UAVs being used "for missions targeting the United States."76 Such

statements had an impact on members of Congress. For example, Senator Bill

Nelson voted for the Iraq war resolution "precisely because of the

administration’s UAV evidence."77 He explained:

I was told not only that [Hussein had weapons of mass destruction] and

that he had the means to deliver them through unmanned aerial vehicles,

but that he had the capability of transporting those UAVs outside of Iraq

______________________________________________________________

73 Id.

74 Air Force Analysts Feel Vindicated on Iraqi Drones, Washington Post (Sept. 26. 2003).

75 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.

76 White House, President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, supra note 19.

77 A Flawed Argument in the Case for War, Washington Post (Feb. 1, 2004).

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and threatening the homeland here in America, specifically by putting

them on ships off the eastern seaboard. . . . I thought there was an

imminent threat.78

In his address to the United Nations, Secretary Powell asserted: "UAVs are well

suited for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. There is ample evidence

that Iraq has dedicated much effort to developing and testing spray devices that

could be adapted for UAVs."79 In making his presentation to the U.N., Secretary

Powell showed a photo of an "illustrative" UAV, which he suggested was wellsuited

for spraying chemical or biological weapons over the United States.80 This

presentation affected members of Congress. Senator Dianne Feinstein stated that

of the various pieces of evidence presented by Secretary Powell, "the most

compelling to me was the unmanned aerial vehicle and the development of that

with spray tanks. And he kind of laid down the fact that this could be in our

country and there was a possibility that this might be used against the United

States."81

President Bush later highlighted Secretary Powell’s presentation, claiming: "All

the world has now seen the footage of an Iraqi Mirage aircraft with a fuel tank

modified to spray biological agents over wide areas. . . . A UAV launched from a

vessel off the American coast could reach hundreds of miles inland."82

The Iraq Survey Group found little to substantiate these claims. According to Dr.

Kay’s January 28, 2004, testimony, Iraq’s UAV program "was not a strong point"

because it was only "theoretically possible" to have "snuck one of those on a ship

off the East Coast of the United States that might have been able to deliver a small

amount someplace." He found only that "at least one of those families of UAVs"

was a "descendent" of another model that once had a "spray tank on it." In his

assessment, there was no "existing deployment capability at that point for any sort

of systematic military attack."83

______________________________________________________________

78 Id.

79 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39.

80 Id.

81 NBC News Special Report: The Case Against Iraq, NBC (Feb. 5, 2003).

82 White House, President Bush: "World Can Rise to This Moment" (Feb. 6, 2003).

83 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12.

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In April and early May 2003, military forces found mobile trailers in Iraq.84

Although intelligence experts disputed the purpose of the trailers, Administration

officials repeatedly asserted that they were mobile biological weapons

laboratories. In total, President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary

Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice made 34

misleading statements about the trailers in 27 separate public appearances.

Shortly after the trailers were found, the CIA and DIA issued an unclassified

white paper evaluating the trailers.85 The white paper was released without

coordination with other members of the intelligence community, however. It was

disclosed later that engineers from DIA who examined the trailers concluded that

they were most likely used to produce hydrogen for artillery weather balloons.86

A former senior intelligence official reported that "only one of 15 intelligence

analysts assembled from three agencies to discuss the issue in June endorsed the

white paper conclusion."87

Despite these doubts within the intelligence community, the five officials

repeatedly misled Congress and the public about the trailers by asserting without

qualification that they were proof of Iraq’s biological weapons program.

President Bush made perhaps the most prominent misleading statement on this

matter when he proclaimed:

We found the weapons of mass destruction. We found biological

laboratories. You remember when Colin Powell stood up in front of the

world, and he said, Iraq has got laboratories, mobile labs to build

biological weapons. They’re illegal. They’re against the United Nations

resolutions, and we’ve so far discovered two. And we’ll find more

weapons as time goes on. But for those who say we haven’t found the

banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they’re wrong, we

found them.88

______________________________________________________________

84 Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare

Agent Production Plants (May 28, 2003) (online at www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraqi_mobile_plants/

paper_w.pdf).

85 Id.

86 Iraqi Trailers Said to Make Hydrogen, Not Biological Arms, New York Times (Aug. 9, 2003).

87 Powell’s Case, a Year Later: Gaps in Picture of Iraq Arms, New York Times (Feb. 1, 2004).

88 White House, Interview of the President by TVP, Poland (May 29, 2003).

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Similarly, Secretary Powell’s comments about the trailers frequently asserted with

certainty that the trailers were biological weapons laboratories. For example:

• On May 21, 2003, Secretary Powell said: "The intelligence community

has really looked hard at these vans, and we can find no other purpose for

them. Although you can’t find actual germs on them, they have been

cleaned and we don’t know whether they have been used for that purpose

or not, but they were certainly designed and constructed for that purpose.

And we have taken our time on this one because we wanted to make sure

we got it right. And the intelligence community, I think, is convinced now

that that’s the purpose they served."89

• On May 22, 2003, Secretary Powell said, "So far, we have found the

biological weapons vans that I spoke about when I presented the case to

the United Nations on the 5th of February, and there is no doubt in our

minds now that those vans were designed for only one purpose, and that

was to make biological weapons."90

The doubts about the trailers were confirmed by the work of the Iraq Survey

Group. According to Dr. Kay’s January 28, 2004, testimony, "the consensus

opinion is that when you look at those two trailers, while [they] had capabilities in

many areas, their actual intended use was not for the production of biological

weapons."91 In a separate interview, Dr. Kay explained that the trailers "were

actually designed to produce hydrogen for weather balloons, or perhaps to

produce rocket fuel."92

Another key component of the case for going to war against Iraq was the claim

that Iraq was supporting al Qaeda. As was the case with other featured claims,

the al Qaeda claims were disputed by intelligence officials within the

Administration. Yet President Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld,

Secretary Powell, and National Security Advisor Rice regularly failed to

______________________________________________________________

89 U.S. Department of State, Remarks with Bahrain’s Crown Prince Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Al-

Khalifa After Meeting (May 21, 2003).

90 U.S. Department of State, Interview with French Television 1 (May 22, 2003).

91 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12.

92 Ex-Inspector Says CIA Missed Disarray in Iraqi Arms Program, supra note 70 (paraphrasing

Dr. Kay). According to recent media accounts, United States intelligence officials never actually

interviewed the source who provided the original tip that Iraq had mobile bioweapons trailers.

Foreign Agency, CIA Notes, Washington Post (Mar. 5, 2004).

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acknowledge these doubts or the weaknesses in the case linking Iraq and al

Qaeda. They made 61 misleading statements about the strength of the Iraq-al

Qaeda alliance in 52 public appearances.

Well before the war on Iraq, the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate

made clear that the U.S. intelligence community had serious doubts about the

threat of Iraq arming al Qaeda. In its section on "Confidence Levels for Selected

Key Judgements in this Estimate," the NIE gave a "Low Confidence" rating to the

notion of "Whether in desperation Saddam would share chemical or biological

weapons with Al Qa’ida." 93 The discussion of this possibility in the NIE

contained highly qualified language: "Saddam, if sufficiently desperate, might

decide that only an organization such as al-Qa’ida . . . could perpetuate the type of

terrorist attack that he would hope to conduct."94 The NIE also reported that

"Baghdad for now appears to be drawing a line short of conducting terrorist

attacks with conventional or CBW against the United States, fearing that exposure

of Iraqi involvement would provide Washington a stronger cause for making

war."95

Director of Central Intelligence Tenet stated in an October 2002 letter that there

were intelligence reports of contacts between al Qaeda and Iraq. At the same

time, however, he asserted clear qualifiers for this information: "Our

understanding of the relationship between Iraq and al-Qa’ida is evolving and is

based on sources of varying reliability."96 Senators who were briefed by

intelligence officials in the fall of 2002 expressed skepticism about the

significance of the link. For example, Senator Jeffords on October 8, 2002,

stated, "While there is talk of cooperation between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and I don’t

doubt that there has been some cooperation, I have not seen any hard evidence of

close cooperation."97 According to another account:

Sen. Richard J. Durbin . . . said some classified information he had seen

did not support the administration’s portrayal of the Iraqi threat. "It’s

troubling to have classified information that contradicts statements made

______________________________________________________________

93 National Intelligence Council, supra note 16.

94 Id. (emphasis added).

95 Id.

96 Threats and Responses; CIA Letter to Senate on Baghdad’s Intentions, New York Times (Oct.

9, 2002) (reprinting text of October 7, 2002, letter from Mr. Tenet to Senator Bob Graham, in

which Mr. Tenet says, "We have solid reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-

Qa’ida going back a decade," and "credible information indicates that Iraq and al-Qa’ida have

discussed safe haven and reciprocal non-aggression").

97 Statement of Senator Jim Jeffords, Senate Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force against Iraq

(Oct. 8, 2002).

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by the administration," Durbin said. "There’s more they should share with

the public." Durbin would not be more specific, but he did say the

committee had received the views of some analysts who do not share the

administration’s conclusion that Iraq was an urgent threat with important

links to al-Qaeda terrorists.98

Journalists also reported that many intelligence officials within the Administration

doubted the significance of reported contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda.

According to one report:

[A]nalysts at the C.I.A. . . . believed that the evidence showed some

contacts between Baghdad and the terrorist organization, but not an

operational alliance. . . . [A]t the C.I.A., many analysts believed that Mr.

bin Laden saw Mr. Hussein as one of the corrupt secular Arab leaders who

should be toppled.99

Despite the doubts of many intelligence analysts, the five Administration officials

regularly asserted that there was a close relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda.

For example:

• In a November 7, 2002, speech, President Bush stated: Saddam Hussein is

"a threat because he is dealing with Al Qaida. . . . [A] true threat facing

our country is that an Al Qaida-type network trained and armed by

Saddam could attack America and not leave one fingerprint." 100

• In his January 28, 2003, State of the Union address, President Bush stated:

"Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications, and

statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and

protects terrorists, including members of al Qaeda. Secretly, and without

fingerprints, he could provide one of his hidden weapons to terrorists, or

help them develop their own."101

• In his February 5, 2003, remarks to the United Nations, Secretary of State

Colin Powell stated: "what I want to bring to your attention today is the

potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda

terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and

modern methods of murder. Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network

______________________________________________________________

98 Democrats Urge Focus on Terror Instead of Iraq, Philadelphia Inquirer (Oct. 5, 2002).

99 The Struggle for Iraq: Intelligence; Hussein Warned Iraqis to Beware Outside Fighters,

Document Says, New York Times (Jan. 14, 2004).

100 White House, President Outlines Priorities (Nov. 7, 2002).

101 White House, State of the Union, supra note 43.

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headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi an associate and collaborator of Usama

bin Laden and his al-Qaida lieutenants."102

• In remarks on May 1, 2003, announcing the end of major combat

operations in Iraq, President Bush stated: "The battle of Iraq is one

victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11, 2001 — and

still goes on. . . . [T]he liberation of Iraq . . . removed an ally of al

Qaeda."103

Vice President Cheney’s statements on this topic repeatedly cited reports of a

specific alleged Iraq–al Qaeda contact: a meeting between Mohammed Atta, one

of the September 11 hijackers, and a senior Iraqi official in Prague a few months

before September 11, 2001. For example, Vice President Cheney stated on

September 14, 2003:

With respect to 9/11, of course, we’ve had the story that’s been public out

there. The Czechs alleged that Mohammed Atta, the lead attacker, met in

Prague with a senior Iraqi intelligence official five months before the

attack, but we’ve never been able to develop anymore of that yet either in

terms of confirming it or discrediting it. We just don’t know.104

The Vice President’s assertions about this meeting omitted key information. He

did not acknowledge that the CIA and FBI had concluded before the war in Iraq

that "the meeting probably did not take place";105 that Czech government officials

had developed doubts regarding whether this meeting occurred;106 or that

American records indicate that Mr. Atta was in Virginia Beach, Virginia, at the

time of the purported meeting.107

Assessments following the war further highlighted the tenuous nature of the

Administration’s assertions about an Iraq-al Qaeda alliance. According to the

New York Times, "Since American forces toppled the Hussein government and the

United States gained access to captured Iraqi officials and Iraqi files, the C.I.A.

has not yet uncovered evidence that has altered its prewar assessment concerning

______________________________________________________________

102 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39.

103 White House, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (May

1, 2003).

104 Meet the Press, supra note 21.

105 A Region Inflamed: Inquiry; Iraqi Agent Denies He Met 9/11 Hijacker in Prague Before

Attacks on the U.S., New York Times (Dec. 13, 2003).

106 Id.

107 Id.

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the connections between Mr. Hussein and Osama bin Laden, the leader of al

Qaeda, officials said."108

Consistent with this view, during Dr. Kay’s testimony before the Senate Armed

Services Committee on January 28, 2004, the following exchange occurred

between Senator Warner and Dr. Kay:

Senator Warner: Any evidence with regard to participation by either

Saddam Hussein or his principal henchmen in the WMD-sharing with al

Qaeda or any other terrorist organizations?

Dr. Kay: Senator Levin — Senator Warner, there is no evidence that I can

think of that I know of.109

President Bush made 55 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in

27 separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 55 misleading statements by President Bush, 4 claimed that Iraq posed an

urgent threat; 14 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 18

overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 19 misrepresented

Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

______________________________________________________________

108 A Region Inflamed, supra note 105. Last October, Undersecretary for Defense Policy Douglas

J. Feith sent a memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee regarding the connection between Iraq

and al Qaeda. In November, the Weekly Standard published the memo’s classified annex,

claiming that its list of Iraq–al Qaeda contacts proved "an operational relationship from the early

1990s" and that "there can no longer be any serious argument about whether Saddam Hussein’s

Iraq worked with Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to plot against Americans." Case Closed,

Weekly Standard (Nov. 24, 2003). The Defense Department, however, immediately issued an

official statement that "[t]he classified annex was not an analysis of the substantive issue of the

relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda, and it drew no conclusions." U.S. Department of

Defense, News Release: DOD Statement on News Reports of al-Qaeda and Iraq Connections

(Nov. 15, 2003). Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet also recently testified regarding

the Feith memo, stating that the CIA "did not agree with the way the way the data was

characterized in that document." Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet

before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on National Security Threats (Mar. 9,

2004).

109 Testimony of David Kay, supra note 12.

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On October 7, 2002, just days before the October 10 and October 11, 2002,

congressional votes on the Iraq war resolution, President Bush gave an address in

Cincinnati, Ohio, about the threat posed by Iraq. In this speech, President Bush

made 11 misleading statements about Iraq, the highest number of misleading

statements in any single appearance by any of the five officials. In this single

appearance, President Bush made misleading statements about Iraq’s nuclear

capabilities, Iraq’s efforts to procure aluminum tubes, Iraq’s chemical and

biological capabilities, and Iraq’s connection to al Qaeda.

Some of the misleading statements made by President Bush included the

following:

• "On its present course, the Iraqi regime is a threat of unique urgency. . . .

It has developed weapons of mass death."110

• "The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought

significant quantities of uranium from Africa."111

• "The liberation of Iraq . . . removed an ally of al Qaeda."112

• "We found the weapons of mass destruction. . . . [F]or those who say we

haven’t found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons,

they’re wrong, we found them."113

Vice President Cheney made 51 misleading statements about the threat posed by

Iraq in 25 separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 51 misleading statements by Vice President Cheney, 1 claimed that Iraq

posed an urgent threat; 22 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons;

7 overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 21

misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

Some of the misleading statements made by Vice President Cheney included the

following:

______________________________________________________________

110 White House, President, House Leadership Agree on Iraq Resolution, supra note 8.

111 White House, State of the Union, supra note 43.

112 White House, President Bush Announces, supra note 103.

113 White House, Interview of the President, supra note 88.

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• "[W]e do know, with absolute certainty, that he is using his procurement

system to acquire the equipment he needs in order to enrich uranium to

build a nuclear weapon."114

• Saddam Hussein "had an established relationship with al Qaeda."115

• "[W]e believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons."116

Secretary Rumsfeld made 52 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq

in 23 separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 52 misleading statements by Secretary Rumsfeld; 5 claimed that Iraq posed

an urgent threat; 18 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 21

overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 8 misrepresented

Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

Some of the misleading statements made by Secretary Rumsfeld included the

following:

• "Now transport yourself forward a year, two years, or a week, or a

month, and if Saddam Hussein were to take his weapons of mass

destruction and transfer them, either use himself, or transfer them to

the Al-Qaeda, and somehow the Al-Qaeda were to engage in an attack

on the United States . . . with a weapon of mass destruction you’re not

talking about 300, or 3,000 people potentially being killed, but 30,000,

or 100,000 . . . human beings."120

______________________________________________________________

114 Meet the Press, supra note 38.

115 White House, Remarks by the Vice President to the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 10, 2003).

116 Meet the Press, supra note 20.

117 Meet the Press, supra note 38.

118 White House, Remarks by the Vice President at the Air National Guard Senior Leadership

Conference (Dec. 2, 2002).

119 White House, Remarks by the Vice President, supra note 115.

120 U.S. Department of Defense, supra note 11.

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• "[Saddam Hussein’s] regime . . . recently was discovered seeking

significant quantities of uranium from Africa."121

• "We said they had a nuclear program. That was never any debate."123

Secretary Powell made 50 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in

34 separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 50 misleading statements by Secretary Powell, 1 claimed that Iraq posed an

urgent threat; 10 exaggerated Iraq’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons; 32

overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons capacity; and 7 misrepresented

Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

Sometimes Secretary Powell used caveats and qualifying language in his public

statements. For example, on March 9, 2003, he said, "Well with respect to the

aluminum tubes, we still believe the case is out. The CIA has done a great deal of

analysis on those tubes. They are not persuaded they were just for rockets. And,

in fact, another nation this week, a European nation, came forward with some

additional information that still, I think, leaves it an open question as to what the

purpose of those tubes was."124 Secretary Powell’s acknowledgement of

differences in this example was not an unqualified statement that only mentioned

one side of an intelligence debate.

On numerous other occasions, however, Secretary Powell made unconditional

statements about the threats posed by Iraq without disclosing the doubts of

intelligence officials. Some of the misleading statements he made included the

following:

• "Iraq is now concentrating . . . on developing and testing smaller

UAVs. . . . UAVs are well suited for dispensing chemical and biological

weapons."125

______________________________________________________________

121 Press Conference with Donald Rumsfeld, supra note 45.

122 U.S. Department of Defense, supra note 11.

123 This Week With George Stephanopoulos, supra note 23.

124 Meet the Press, NBC (Mar. 9, 2003).

125 U.S. Department of State, supra note 39.

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• "The more we wait, the more chance there is for this dictator with clear

ties to terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, more time for him to pass a

weapon, share a technology, or use these weapons again."126

• "So far, we have found the biological weapons vans that I spoke about

when I presented the case to the United Nations on the 5th of February,

and there is no doubt in our minds that those vans were designed for only

one purpose, and that was to make biological weapons."127

Ms. Rice made 29 misleading statements about the threat posed by Iraq in 16

separate public statements or appearances.

Of the 29 misleading statements by Ms. Rice, 17 concerned Iraq’s efforts to

develop nuclear weapons; 6 overstated Iraq’s chemical or biological weapons

capacity; and 6 misrepresented Iraq’s links to al Qaeda.

Some of the misleading statements made by Ms. Rice included the following:

• "We do know that [Saddam Hussein] is actively pursuing a nuclear

weapon."128

• "We do know that there have been shipments going into . . . Iraq, for

instance, of aluminum tubes that really are only suited to — high quality

aluminum tools that are only really suited for nuclear weapons programs,

centrifuge programs."130

• "[T]he declaration fails to account for or explain Iraq’s efforts to get

uranium from abroad."131

Ms. Rice made significantly more statements that were false — 8 — than any of

the other four officials. Many of these statements came in June and July 2003

______________________________________________________________

126 U.S. Department of State, Secretary of State Powell, Remarks at the World Economic Forum

(Jan. 26, 2003).

127 U.S. Department of State, supra note 90.

128 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 37.

129 Condoleezza Rice, supra note 44.

130 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 37.

131 Condoleezza Rice, supra note 44.

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when questions were being raised about why President Bush asserted in his State

of the Union address that Iraq was seeking to import uranium from Africa. Ms.

Rice repeatedly stated during this period that no one in the White House was

informed of the doubts about this uranium claim. For example, she stated:

• "We did not know at the time — no one knew at the time, in our circles —

maybe someone knew down in the bowels of the agency, but no one in our

circles knew that there were doubts and suspicions that this might be a

forgery."132

• "[H]ad there been even a peep that the agency did not want that sentence

in or that George Tenet did not want that sentence in, that the director of

Central Intelligence did not want it in, it would have been gone."133

These statements were simply false. As explained above, the CIA had repeatedly

communicated its objections to White House officials, including Ms. Rice.134

Because of the gravity of the subject and the President’s unique access to

classified information, members of Congress and the public expect the President

and his senior officials to take special care to be balanced and accurate in

describing national security threats. It does not appear, however, that President

Bush, Vice President Cheney, Secretary Rumsfeld, Secretary Powell, and

National Security Advisor Rice met this standard in the case of Iraq. To the

contrary, these five officials repeatedly made misleading statements about the

threat posed by Iraq. In 125 separate appearances, they made 11 misleading

statements about the urgency of Iraq’s threat, 81 misleading statements about

Iraq’s nuclear activities, 84 misleading statements about Iraq’s chemical and

biological capabilities, and 61 misleading statements about Iraq’s relationship

with al Qaeda.

______________________________________________________________

132 Meet the Press, NBC (June 8, 2003).

133 Face the Nation, CBS (July 11, 2003).

134 See White House, Dan Bartlett and Steve Hadley Hold Press Briefing, supra note 6.